This post is a reponse to a very nice blog post by a friend. You can find it here.
When one speaks of “spiritual experiences” or “religious experiences” what comes to mind? Often we discount religious experience as nothing more that excessive emotional rambling, mysticism, ritualism, or blatant lies that reinforce a false hope. I don’t particularly buy these claims, but they do act as the standard dismissal for most atheists or a-theologians.
In the aforementioned blog article, the author discusses these claims generally by pointing out several issues that he has with religious experience, and its seemingly non-justified position among the dictums of proof.
His points are as follows:
1)
Religious experiences tend to be culturally specific and socially influenced. Most people’s religious experiences tend to lead them to believe in either the religion they were raised in, or the religion of their friends. Our feelings in general tend to be strongly influenced by our peers, and religious feelings seem to be the same.
This is reasonable and acceptable. I think there is little debate to be had about the claim that human interaction and belief structures are strongly influenced by association, but how does this not provide evidence for the existence of God? Is it possible that the only way to come to a personal knowledge of God’s existence may be via some type of person-specific reality? I mean, given that God may exist outside of our observable universe or (as I hold) that we are likely to exist in some type of Turing-type world that is largely digital, personal experience may be the only way to adequately transcend the bounds of the observable world or create a nexus amid our reality and that of God’s. Additionally, you can really never know if the experience a person is having is not some type of Gettier-like situation that just happens to be correct -which, while by accident, the person does have of evidence.
I would also call upon the works of Joseph Campbell and his comparative mythologies. He was able to demonstrate that mythologies and religion do map to common elements: things like eternal life, Deity, and other supernatural conditions [1]. So, if all religious experence are rooted in a set of basic common elements, is it not possible that maybe those things are similar to any other type of basic truth or trivial piece of scientific evidence? Arguably, it would seem as such.
2)
Religious experiences often contradict each other. If you think one religion is right, you have to admit that most people’s religious experiences lead them to the wrong conclusion. Even people who have been exposed to the “right” religion have experiences that lead them to other religions.
They may contradict each other in their particulars, but not necessarily in their basic components (as I pointed out in the previous response). However, can science and the observations of well trained men not do the same? Having spent time working as a researcher, I can say with certainty that scientific experience -and any experience, in general- is subject to the same criticism that is being leveled here. Indeed, many mathematical theories have generated fierce debate and dogmatic followings, scientific systems have also claimed to be the only and most explanatory system of a subset or part of some observable phenomena while all the others are not. This criticism is a problem for mankind -a fallible creature who fancies his observations and feelings to be tantamount to the truth and beauty found in a mathematical proof.
3)
Memories change over time. Powerful religious experiences are often not recorded clearly and specifically until long after they’ve occurred. Especially when a story is retold several times, its main points tend to be increasingly emphasized and then exaggerated over time. The memory itself will change accordingly
So what? I mean, I don’t think this objection differs from the last one. It still relies on fragility, which runs the gamut in science and any system that requires some type of consistent dogma or testability (the sad thing is that in science and other “testable” studies, they just falsify data or twist it to where it does not need to change as per it is always a lie). Again fallibility does not mean that the experience that was actualized in the first instance was not an actual representation of some proof or personally-derived evidence for God.
4)
Confirmation Bias causes us to remember the experiences that confirm our beliefs. We tend to forget all the times we prayed or “had impressions” and nothing remarkable happened. We also go through so many experiences, that what seem like amazing coincidences are actually very likely to occur occasionally. If those seemingly amazing coincidences confirm our beliefs in some way, you can bet that story will be remembered and shared.
Psychologists have long proven that the tenants of confirmation bias extend into virtually every facet of human thought. Scientists, and the layman, are both subject to this vexing characteristic of the human mind. Professors defend, until their last breath, outmoded philosophical systems, archaic scientific theories, or even things that are contradicted. This is not a problem that would remove any evidence derived from experiences that we might have. This is especially true given that since all religious experience is a particular type of empirical observation, the truth value of those observations is not directly knowable to those who could not have participated in the experience. Thus, it follows, that levying any criticism against an experience by labeling it as confirmation bias may just as well apply to the critic as well as the criticized, and the result is an unwarranted and unfruitful deduction that leads to a dead-end.
5)
Even very spiritual people are often wrong. Even blessings from Apostles sometimes do not come to pass.
Its not about being right as it is about proof. People can be wrong in instances, and that does not mean that the general conclusion that is their faith, is equally wrong. If that were true, then I don’t know how we could read any book on physics and remain confident that basic theories like gravitational forces exist. This is irrelevant from the point of the article.
The conclusion:
All of this is to say that spiritual experiences are not surprising. In order for evidence to provide strong confirmation of a theory, the evidence must be different than what we would otherwise expect. Given what we know about human psychology, most spiritual experiences do not meet this standard, and hence do not provide strong confirmation of either the Gospel of the existence of God. I conclude that religious experiences, although powerful, are not reliable guides to truth. I am all for seeking after and having spiritual experiences in our lives, and I try to nurture myself spiritually (meaning mentally and emotionally) as well. But when determining the nature of physical reality, I think that reliable, repeatable, and verifiable evidence should definitely have precedence.
The second sentence of this conclusion is false. Why would a theory have to be subject to alternate expectations in order to be confirmable? That is not a necessary condition for confirmability in any regard. We can have expectations that some outcome X possess properties Y; we could even test X to get Y, and this would not effect confirmability. Actually, a theory has to have the following conditions to warrant it as true (and confirmable): A theory must exhibit consistency (it cannot cause contradictions in other theories upon which it relies), theories must be testable either empirically or rationally, and a theory must be logically possible. Spiritual experiences may not in their particular accounts meet any rigorous definition of theory, but their general implication may. That is not to say that particular instances of experiential claims are not important, it just means that they may be outside testability or may be subject to human fragilities and, thus, are unable to meet certain standard due to explanatory barriers. However, that does not defraud or remove them from being types of evidence -even if the degree is low.
The declaration at the end, “But when determining the nature of physical reality, I think that reliable, repeatable, and verifiable evidence should definitely have precedence” makes a nice point. Indeed, I think that no theist would debate this, for I am confident that a theist would argue that the physical reality with which this author is dealing is limited to the observable universe only. He would have to agree that his perceptions cause that reliability holds only the the limits of what it is that he senses, wants, and can physically test; he would have to assent to the claim that the Problem of Induction renders repetition in testing nothing more than a game of Russian Roulette with respect to verifiability and truth generation. Not to mention the large amount of faith that one must have in the physical extensions of mankind.
We know that the observable universe is not all there is. We know by way of basic mathematics that dimensions exist, in vast complexity, outside of our ability to directly experience them. The same system of mathematics which has proved this and provided the language scientists use on a daily basis has also proven logically that there must be a world among all possible dimensions in which a being that possesses all potentials exists. Moreover, by probability theory the chances that all things that we witness and perceive of were the act of pure random outcomes is so small that, when speaking of rationality, I have better odds of believing that a unicorn will bring me a leprechaun who will grant me three wishes while I feast in Valhalla with Odin on a six-sided square table.
[1] Written between 1962 and 1968, Campbell’s four-volume work The Masks of God covers mythology from around the world, from ancient to modern. Where The Hero with a Thousand Faces focused on the commonality of mythology (the “elementary ideas”), the Masks of God books focus upon historical and cultural variations the monomyth takes on (the “folk ideas”). In other words, where The Hero with a Thousand Faces draws perhaps more from psychology, the Masks of God books draw more from anthropology and history. Campbell also expounds on common elements of symbolism and belief structures present in virtually every culture and religious system dating back to the ancient world.
The Thought Circle 
It’s a long but good response, and I’d like to respond in kind.
Do my criticisms apply to science as well as religion? To some extent, but they don’t affect science nearly as much. First of all, scientists are committed to finding knowledge and helping theories progress whereas religious people are generally committed to defending their unchanging religion, even in the face of contrary evidence. Scientists also use several techniques to overcome problems such as memory fallibility and confirmation bias. They choose to focus on data that can be recorded objectively and immediately. Well-designed experiments avoid confirmation bias. Most scientists will change their beliefs in the face of contrary evidence. So in theory, these problems affect science as well as religion, but in practice, science is often able to avoid these problems better.
I’d like to defend that “In order for evidence to provide strong confirmation of a theory, the evidence must be different than what we would otherwise expect.” Even crazy theories can be modified to “fit the evidence.” Let’s say I have a theory that alien abductions are real. I cite the numerous testimonials, which have a great deal of consistency. You point out that reports of alien abductions virtually stop at certain national boundaries. I respond that maybe the aliens are more interested in studying certain nationalities. I can always modify my crazy theory to fit the evidence. But that does NOT mean that the evidence confirms my theory. That’s why to achieve strong confirmation, the theory has to predict something unexpected. Evidence for evolution and the theory of relativity have both met this criteria. Spiritual experiences do not meet this criteria.
I agree that I limit myself to the observable universe and what is implied by observable evidence. There probably are things that exist that are not observable, but they can’t affect me in any way, and I have no way of knowing whether they are true or not, so they don’t really concern me. I don’t understand what yo umean by “the physical extensions of mankind.”
No one says that “all things that we witness and perceive of were the act of pure random outcomes.” That’s total craziness. Natural selection is not randomness, it’s a natural process. Our existence is the outcome of that natural process.
While most of your response has some really good points, I still can’t believe you think that a system of mathematics can prove that there is “a being that possesses all potentials exists.” I think that’s craziness too. Give me a reference for this and if I have time I’ll email you about it. Thanks for the response.
I must apologize for my craziness because it seems that such craziness is the philosophical wall that took down Dawkins during his debate with Plantinga and has created the system of Digital Mechanics that has suggested that all natural phenomena is the byproduct of complex programing and digital synthesis. Let me address your reply and try to explain why mathematical reasoning is the pinnacle of all empirical function and scientific endeavor, and that if a proof is right, it will always manifest itself to us empirically.
Frist, I will adress your reply and clarify.
(1). You claimed that, “First of all, scientists are committed to finding knowledge and helping theories progress whereas religious people are generally committed to defending their unchanging religion, even in the face of contrary evidence. Scientists also use several techniques to overcome problems such as memory fallibility and confirmation bias. They choose to focus on data that can be recorded objectively and immediately. Well-designed experiments avoid confirmation bias. Most scientists will change their beliefs in the face of contrary evidence.”
-I agree that religious people usually fail to allow progression of ideas. However, I am not defending religion. I am defending the epistemic value that is present in personal experience, so the religious point you made is a non-sequitur. As for your claim that science has techniques to overcome problems and what not, I agree that it has systems in play to avoid error, but that does not matter in the slightest if science is flawed to begin with. As I have said (ad nauseum), science is inherently flawed and fallible; it is subject to perceptual, conventional, and inductive problems of knowledge, meaning and data collection. Its confirmation ability is strictly limited to perception and external observable conditions -it is a poor tool if it not paired with rational systems.
This leads me to the next point: rationalism and empiricism.
Science is an empirical system when held exclusively to observation and testable data; This is fine. However, you continually tout science as superior in form and usage given its pragmatic value or its supposed necessity (“it is the best we got-type” of mentality), but have you ever thought about its limitations? Science is a poor tool to test anything without the use of mathematical reasoning. We scientists know of a law in Mathematics and logic that is largely accepted as categorically true because its removal would destroy any validity that science holds. It is called the Theorem of Consistency.
The idea behind this important law is simple: if I can mathematically deduce X, and X is consistent with all other mathematical reasoning, then X will always manifest itself in at least one empirical reality. That means that if I can reason correctly to something, it will always be true both in terms of logic and real-life. This is the theorem that I saw take Dawkings down to his knees and cause him to mumble and stumble over his words! It is lethal to atheists because it demonstrates MATHEMATICALLY and SCIENTIFICALLY that if I can create a proof that is consistent and valid, it must necessarily hold up scientifically. This is a fact of reality so please stop dismissing it as if it were “craziness” or some other verbose idea that you can stomp over. It is important to human thought and it roots science to math. Indeed, Einstein relied on this when he first formulated General Relativity. It was not empirically testable, but we found out much latter that it was empirically sound by more advance observable methods -these things were not available to Einstein; he had not way to test his theory, but the math confirmed it and we found that it was true.
Leibniz and other mathematicians have created several hundred mathematical proofs that have claimed to prove God’s existence. Some have errors and some are sound -others, still, are almost perfect. So, by the laws of science, if these proofs are anywhere on par with things like Relativity in terms of their mathematical significance, rigor, and consistency, then by necessity, God exists. Quite simple really (See Antony Flew and his book: There is a God: How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind). In fact, one of the most devastating mathematical proofs that I know of (and that it is amazingly complex in structure) is Godel’s proof:
1. □Ex ≡ □Px ≡ □Gx A
2 □Ex A
3. ◊Px ≡ □Px A
4. ◊Px A
5. □Px ≡ □Gx 1, 2 ≡E
6 │ □Px 3, 4 ≡E
7. □Gx 5,
6. ≡E
Alt. 1, 1st.
1 │ □Ex ≡ □Px ≡ □Gx A (A is Assumption)
2 │ □Ex A
3 │ ◊Px ⊃ □Px A
4 │ ◊Px A
5 │ □Px ≡ □Gx 1, 2 ≡E
6 │ □Px 3, 4 ⊃E
7 │ □Gx 5, 6 ≡E
Alt. 1, 2nd.
1 │ □Ex ≡ □Px ≡ □Gx A (A is Assumption)
2 │ (□Px ⊃ □Nx) ⊃ □Px A
3 │ □Px ⊃ □Nx A
4 │ □Ex A
5 │ □Px 2, 3 ⊃E
6 │ □Px ≡ □Gx 1, 2 ≡E
7 │ □Gx 6, 5 ≡E
This alternative, nr. 2, takes care of the former line ”6 │ (□Px ⊃ □Nx) ⊃ □Px A” and adds overall description by this!
2.
1 │ □Px ≡ □Gx A (A is Assumption)
2 │ □Xx ⊃ □Px A
3 │ □Xx A
4 │ □Px 2, 3 ⊃E
5 │ □Gx 1, 4 ≡E
1 │ ◊Cx ≡ □Gx A (A is Assumption)
2 │ □Px ∨ ~□Px A 3 │ □Px ⊃ ◊Cx A
4 ││ □Px A 0 ││—————–S1
5 ││ □Px 6 R
6 ││ ~□Px A 0 ││—————–S1
7 ││ □Px 6 R
8 │ □Px 4, 6-9 ∨E
9 │ ◊Cx 8, 3 ⊃E
10│ □Gx 9, 1 ≡E
By Proof:
:.
1 │ □Bx ≡ □Gx A (A is Assumption)
2 │ ◊Ax ≡ □Bx ≡ (◊Ax ⊃ □Bx) A
3 │ ◊Ax A
4 │ □Bx 3, 2 ≡E
5 │ □Gx 4, 1 ≡E
This is a modal logic-based proof and requires some translation: definition 1: x is God-like if and only if x has as essential properties those and only those properties which are positive Definition 2: A is an essence of x if and only if for every property B, x has B necessarily if and only if A entails B Definition 3: x necessarily exists if and only if every essence of x is necessarily exemplified Axiom 1: If a property is positive, then its negation is not positive. Axiom 2: Any property entailed by—i.e., strictly implied by—a positive property is positive Axiom 3: The property of being God-like is positive Axiom 4: If a property is positive, then it is necessarily positive Axiom 5: Necessary existence is positive Axiom 6: For any property P, if P is positive, then being necessarily P is positive. Theorem 1: If a property is positive, then it is consistent, i.e., possibly exemplified. Corollary 1: The property of being God-like is consistent. Theorem 2: If something is God-like, then the property of being God-like is an essence of that thing. Theorem 3: Necessarily, the property of being God-like is exemplified. By Axiom S5, God exists.
Note that this avoids the Problem of Incoherence by deducing the existence of God, along with other necessary truths, from standard definitions. I suggest that if one fully understood the concept of science and mathematics, one must accept his existence by necessity. If one refuses, it is either because of some stronger theory that replaces known truths, or that the person in question is merely being ideologically stubborn.
I read most of Plantinga’s review of The God Delusion to figure out what you’re talking about there. I think Plantinga had some good points. Dawkins’ argument makes some subtle assumptions that intelligence or complexity is the result of complex structure. If you believe that intelligence is some kind of a formless ghost-like floaty-thing, like humans used to think before they understood how the brain works, then you can’t argue that something is extremely unlikely because of how complicated its structure would have to be. That is a good point. My super-brief response would be that the amount of evidence that one should require to substantial belief in that thing (God, in this case) should be determined by how well it “fits in” with current scientific views. That’s because current scientific views, although fallible, have generally been built on evidence. In particular, we have evidence from neuroscience that all “intelligence” we’ve ever observed is the result of extremely complicated structure. I think many other attributes of “God,” as postulated by, for example, the Mormon faith, violate scientific understanding, so quite a lot of evidence ought to be demanded to substantiate belief. But I won’t elaborate for brevity.
I don’t find Godel’s proof convincing. As I understand it, he defines “God” as having all positive attributes, and one of those attributes must be “necessary existence,” because that would definitely be positive, so He must necessarily exist. The way I look at it is that this conception of “God” is entirely theoretical, so if that theoretical idea includes the attribute of “necessary existence,” that does not mean that God necessarily exists in reality. I guess I see it as asking “If God exists, what properties does He have?” But since it’s all built on “If God Exists,” you can’t claim that one of those properties is “necessary existence” and then claim that He must exist because the whole thing is built on the “If God Exists” in the first place.
In general, you can’t derive things into existence. For example, you said “if I can mathematically deduce X, and X is consistent with all other mathematical reasoning, then X will always manifest itself in at least one empirical reality.” I don’t think that’s right. When we have equations with clearly defined meanings, then we can derive other equations that are true for a different context that builds on those concepts. But the math existing doesn’t make it true. For example, the Laws of Quantum Mechanics are not derived from anything. They’re just equations that have been fitted to what we observe, and that’s all. There are a few exceptions, such as deriving the Law of Conservation of Energy from point-of-view invariance assumptions, but for the most part math is just a description of what we’ve observed.
Your points are well taken. However, I would like to address that claim that evidence for God “should be determined by how well it “fits in” with current scientific views. That’s because current scientific views, although fallible, have generally been built on evidence” Why? Because we have some finite set of observations? While empirical evidence is important and useful in the observable universe, it does not get around its own limitations. This is why atheism is, at best, not better than theistic knowledge: it can’t get around the same problems that theism has to deal with. Let me explain:
1) The observable universe is not sufficient for proof given fallibility. Digital Mechanics/Philosophy (a sophisticated physics derived from Leibniz) holds that the observable world could be a dimension that is a projection of some other dimension or even constitute an alternative reality that is the byproduct of some type sophisticated engineering –that is why the universe is largely consistent in order and function. The natural laws you speak of are, under this view, merely mathematically derived (it-from-bit, essentially). This view is consistent with modern Quantum Mechanics and has provided the theists with the empirical arguments that they need to get around the short-sided empirical stone-walling that the average atheist uses. This is just one instance of many where theism has its own set of “empirical explanation.” You see, the observations and scientific theories may just as likely be outcomes of some type of programed universe built on the back of a discrete system -or, as Stephen Wolfram pointed out: in a programed system, programs would, if aware, not be able to determine if they are in a program by the mere fact that they would have to violate their own parameters.
Now, point (1) is sufficient to demonstrate scientifically why observation may not work. But, philosophically, we can appeal to other problems: like perception, induction, and the mere fact that outcomes of our observable world do not defeat the notion or existence of God by creating counter-evidence. That is to take a bias stance. Indeed, the teleological argument still holds a ton on water. This is my problem with atheists, in general: they hyper-focus and always pound the buzz-line of “science has not provided evidence for X, so X must not exist or at least it is improbable that X exist” THIS IS REALLY BAD REASONING!!! David Hume demonstrated this in his work on induction. Basically, inductive reasoning (they type scientist do) cannot have a clearly affixed probability attached to it given counterfactual states of being, and the mere fact that random variables are not determined or quantified in any way that can be meaningful (see Taleb’s book: “Fooled by Randomness”).
About Godel’s proof, there is a small, but quickly growing, literature on the ontological arguments which Gödel developed in his notebooks, but which did not appear in print until well after his death. These arguments have been discussed, annotated and amended by various leading logicians, mathematicians and scientists: the upshot is a family of arguments with impeccable logical credentials (some are considered ‘perfect) [1]. The main objection to be made is that Godel’s proof allows for many other things to be God-like. This is a problem for christian theists, but not those of us who do not take such a view. This is the biggest problem that logicians have found. However, your points are interesting, but innocuous to his claim. He starts with a logical assumption and builds from there; the conditional is not present except by definition. Here is a better form (taken from a Modal Logic text book I just dug out of a box):
Definition 1: x is God-like if and only if x has as essential properties those and only those properties which are positive
Definition 2: A is an essence of x if and only if for every property B, x has B necessarily if and only if A entails B
Definition 3: x necessarily exists if and only if every essence of x is necessarily exemplified
Axiom 1: If a property is positive, then its negation is not positive.
Axiom 2: Any property entailed by—i.e., strictly implied by—a positive property is positive
Axiom 3: The property of being God-like is positive
Axiom 4: If a property is positive, then it is necessarily positive
Axiom 5: Necessary existence is positive
Axiom 6: For any property P, if P is positive, then being necessarily P is positive.
Theorem 1: If a property is positive, then it is consistent, i.e., possibly exemplified.
Corollary 1: The property of being God-like is consistent.
Theorem 2: If something is God-like, then the property of being God-like is an essence of that thing.
Theorem 3: Necessarily, the property of being God-like is exemplified.
Here is the problem:
1. If a property belongs to the set, then its negation does not belong to the set.
2. The set is closed under entailment.
3. The property of having as essential properties just those properties which are in the set is itself a member of the set.
4.The set has exactly the same members in all possible worlds.
5. The property of necessary existence is in the set.
6. If a property is in the set, then the property of having that property necessarily is also in the set.
On Gödel’s theoretical assumptions, we can show that any set which conforms to (1)–(6) is such that the property of having as essential properties just those properties which are in that set is exemplified. Gödel wants us to conclude that there is just one intuitive, theologically interesting set of properties which is such that the property of having as essential properties just the properties in that set is exemplified. But, on the one hand, what reason do we have to think that there is any theologically interesting set of properties which conforms to the Gödelian specification? We have not obvious reason, but even if the above considerations are sufficient to cast doubt on the credentials of Gödel’s “proof”, they do not pinpoint where the “proof” goes wrong. In fact, the recent rise in Digital Philosophy has vindicated Godel’s modal logic and has substantially strengthened the argument to the point where it is being called “Godel’s God Theorem.” So, by the laws of Mathematics, the Consistency Theorem should prove that if this proof is valid a-priori, then God must necessarily exist. However, that is not necessary in type. Axiom S5 of modal logic combined with the basic Lewis possible world semantics entail that God must necessarily exist by Godel’s proof. Just like if I prove, mathematically, to you that the area under the curve of F(x)=sin(x) from 0 to pi is 2, it will be 2 if you were to accurately measure it down to its infinitesimals; consistent proofs are never falsified by empirical observation, period.
You are wrong about Quantum Mechanics. Here is a break-down of how it played-out:
In 1859 Gustav Kirchhoff proved a theorem about theoretical blackbody radiation. A blackbody is an object that absorbs all the energy that falls upon it and, because it reflects no light, it would appear black to an observer. A blackbody is also a perfect emitter and Kirchhoff proved that the energy emitted E depends only on the temperature T and the frequency v of the emitted energy, i.e.
E = J(T,v).
He challenged physicists to find the function J.
—Note: Kirchhoff, nor any other physicists of the time, had witnessed or observed black-body radiation or its effects. In a second report made in 1859, Kirchhoff announced a new general principle or law for which he offered a theoretical and mathematical proof, though he did not offer quantitative measurements of radiation powers, which may have been inspired by the coincidence of the wavelengths of spectrally resolved lines of absorption and of emission of visible light. The equation was pure theory. We have just recently matched observation to it. We don’t fit math to reality, that is calculus 101; and the problem of the area of a curve.
What about:
The theoretical considerations using thermodynamics and Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. The result, now known as the Stefan-Boltzmann law?
Both Maxwell and Boltzmann had ZERO observation of their theories (in fact, they were ridiculed for not having sufficient observation), but we know that the Maxwell equations are consitent with current observation. Maybe you would like to claim that they were good guesses, but that won’t bode well for your atheistic world-view.
Moreover, in 1896 Wilhelm Wien proposed a solution to the Kirchhoff challenge. However although his solution matches modern-day experimental observations closely for small values of the wavelength, it was shown to break down in the far infrared by Rubens and Kurlbaum. All brought about by some random mathematical functioning that met the conditions of consistency previously described. Not to mention Von Neumann symbolized the basic theory in operator algebra, which was filled by non-observed truths that CERN has recently vindicated.
If you believe that math, logic, and the like are the product of mere observation, then where was the symbolic starting point? You are now stuck on the horn of a dilemma. If it was at observation and not thought, then whatever observed logically is consistent, so my point holds (on teleological grounds); if it was thought, my point is vindicated.
I would add that one feature of the teleological argument (the evidence bit that we have been kicking around) is found in epistemology. It has been contended that if we do rely on our cognitive faculties, it is reasonable to believe that these are not brought about by naturalistic forces, forces that are entirely driven by chance or are the outcome of processes not formed by an overriding intelligence. An illustration may help to understand the argument. Imagine coming across what appears to be a sign reporting some information about your current altitude (some rocks in a configuration giving you your current location and precise height above sea-level in meters). If you had reason to believe that this “sign” was totally the result of chance configurations, would it still be reasonable to trust it? Some theists argue that it would not be reasonable, and that trusting our cognitive faculties requires us to accept that they were formed by an overarching, good, creative agent -or at least natural laws that are a product of such an agent. So, by merely using the word science and evidence, you don’t throw the previous point in the ditch; you just make your reasoning look short-sided.
————————-
“Men act like brutes in so far as the sequences of their perceptions arise through the principle of experience only, like those empirical physicians who have mere practice without theory.”
1. refer to: Sobel, J., 1987, “Gödel’s Ontological Proof”, in On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright, J. Thomson (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 241–61, Anderson, C., 1990, “Some Emendations on Gödel’s Ontological Proof”, Faith and Philosophy, 7: 291–303, Adams, M. 1995 Introductory Note to *1970” in K. Gödel Collected Works Volume III: Unpublished essays and lectures, S. Feferman, et al. (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 388–402, for the history of these arguments, and for the scholarly annotations and emendations
I’m not trying to achieve “proof” because I don’t think it’s possible, therefore estimating likelihoods is the best I can do. As I posted in a recent comment on Facebook, I’m not concerned about the fact that I can’t prove that we’re not living in the Matrix, and I do not think that puts me in the same boat as the theist.
Just because the theory “fits the evidence” doesn’t make it just as likely. Science has the advantage of having made correct predictions. See the chapter titled “But It Fits!” in Believing Bullshit by Stephen Law.
I don’t feel the need to pinpoint where the “proof” goes wrong, I think I’ve already shown why it doesn’t work, and that’s good enough for me.
Mathematical proofs are true in theory or false in theory, but don’t relate to the real world unless they start with equations that have clearly defined meanings in the real world. So the proof could be true in theory, but that doesn’t mean it’s true in the real world. If you’ve defined “God” in a way that He necessarily exists in theory, that doesn’t mean that He necessarily exists in reality.
For example, with your F(x)=sin(x) example, you’ve proven something in theory, so it’s always true in theory. But that example doesn’t relate to the real world until we assign a real-world meaning to x.
My point with quantum mechanics was that the laws are not derived from other more basic laws. For example, Schrodinger’s wave equation is not derived from a more basic law. The fact that the blackbody radiation law was experimentally verified after it was proposed is cool, and helps vindicate science, but the point is that an equation is not necessarily true just because it’s consistent with itself. An equation that’s derived from something else is only true in the real world if the original equations it was derived from had well-defined real-world meanings.
I’m not saying that laws should never be proposed: they can be when there’s evidence for them, and the fact that they often are vindicated experimentally after provides “strong confirmation” of them, but the point is that a proposed law isn’t necessarily true because it’s consistent with itself.
Laws are proposed when there are good reasons to believe they are true. Those reasons are ultimately related to observation, if only indirect observation. When I say laws should be based on observation, I don’t mean necessarily mean directly, sometimes only indirect evidence is available.
I don’t understand what you’re getting at starting at “on the horn of a dilemma.” Maybe you could explain that a little more clearly (and concisely!).
I understand your analogy with the sign. Our cognitive facilities are the result of evolution, but even though they are faulty, they are good enough that we can figure out when they are faulty. For example, we can tell that our dreams are not real. And finally, if we did not trust our own cognitive facilities, what could we trust? The logic you use to prove God exists depends on us being smart enough to find logical errors. Ultimately, our own cognitive facilities are the only thing we can trust at all, whether we like it or not. That applies to our observation and reason alike.
I’m enjoying the conversation, but because I don’t want to sink too much of my time into it, it might be a few days before I reply. I will eventually though, I’m just letting you know I’m going to limit how much time I spend on this. Talk to you soon.
Shortly, in response to Bennion’s claim that how well strong evidenceis should be judged by how it fits with prevailing scientfic knowledge. That turns the academic burden of proof on its head. Generally, the system which attacks a historically accepted views (theism, or belief in god), is the one that bears the burden of proof of its claim. That burden is not addressed by showing the internal consitency of their findings to their area of research, the burden on the Athiest is proving that God does not exist. This is because it is possible for scientific findings to be true, yet not support a finding that God does not exist.
Nicholas, I’ll assume that we both believe in the natural world, and the scientific worldview. We agree that the things we see exist, the big bang happened, animals evolved, etc. The question is whether an unseen metaphysical world exists as well. So I don’t see it as two competing theories, I see it as accepted reality and an additional theory, postulating more things that aren’t necessary to explain the world as we see it. I default to skepticism about whether things exist that I don’t think there is clear evidence for. I don’t think we should give historical beliefs the benefit of the doubt just for being historical. It’s not like these beliefs extend back to the beginning of humans. Belief in a monotheistic God is only a relatively recent phenomenon.
No one said monotheism, we are speaking of belief in a diety(s) at all. It is true of every single discipline, if you are challenging the status quo, then you bare the burden of disproving the status quo. Given that it is possible that evolution and the big bang occured and god exists as well, those theories do nothing to disprove the existence of a diety(s). This has been the Modern Catholic Church’s view sing Early Pope Jean Paul. Further,ore, the Catholic Church has been making significant contributions to geneomics and physics recently, unless you are going with the Marxist thought that they are living under false consciousness, it would seem that you can indeed believe in both science and religion without contridicting the other. Science is entitled to absolutely no deferrence, and if it is being used to postulate the nonexistence of a phenomenon with deep historical roots, then it needs to be scrutinized even further. Because, there are religious scientists who are still relevant. The entire problem can be boiled down to: correlation does not imply causation, that may or may not be true, it is not a necessity. This is particularly true where science is being used for political ends. Finally, I do not agree with John’s claim that god can be proven empirically, I think those arguments are powerful, but I like you am skeptical. But, I rely on faith, like I assume you do, when you see someone do something you approve of and label that ac “good.” Well, it may or may not be, the facts may turn out to prove that the act was “wrong.” Which would depend on how right and wrong are defined and quantified (inhently subjective). You merely believe that it is right or wrong and have faith that your opinion is correct. That is all that is happening with religious people, they are exerciseing that same line of reasoning.
Great points.
I have been thinking much about the standard talking point endorsed by atheists. Namely, that a scientific world-view somehow is more true than a world-view in which a being called “God” exists. I don’t see how appeals to empirical fact disproves the latter and favors the former. What about science invalidates the existence of a Deity(s)?
I stumbled on an old Axelrod-Rudker debate where Julius Axelrod made the claim that, “Science provides explanitory power that transcends and explains. It provides reasons that undermines the standard religious world view endorsed by the Christian world.” Rudker pointed out an absurdity by arguing that Axelrod appeals to a type of ignorance. Basically, if X is not provable because no one has observed X, then X does not exist. This is a fallacy and, since all fallacies are false, the atheist is making a false argument on first glance. So, why listen to it? I think sums your point up well, Nick.
Following the debate, I created a thought experiment (I have edited it to make it shorter):
Suppose, un be-known to you, that you get sucked into a computer world (al a Tron) Suppose that in order to exist in this world, you are subject to the parameters of the system, and you are composed of what ever the system is composed of. Now, you start to describe your world in great detail. You discover that the world is composed of complexities that follow a logical and consistent patter. You observe phenomena in a way that can be explained and calculated using symbolic systems. You can even test experiments. One day, however, you declare that the world in which you exist is natural and innate. You hold that the world is derived from a set of laws. You call these laws “the laws of Physics.” Following your discovery, you tout your ability and observation power by declaring that the laws you have described gave rise to the system that you exist in; the system is the product of the laws and that no create is likely.
The mere fact that just because something is observable and that it can be described entails that there is no God or active creator, it just plain stupid reasoning. This thought experiment demonstrates that. There is not good reason to buy into explanations of the observed, or to have faith in our ability to make such observations. Indeed, that is all it is for atheists, faith.
Bennion,
First, your exclamation, “I don’t feel the need to pinpoint where the “proof” goes wrong, I think I’ve already shown why it doesn’t work, and that’s good enough for me”, Is not precise. Your “point” was nonsensical. You did not address the argument as I pointed out. He does not use a conditional in the sense or way your supposed. So, I don’t think erroneous reasoning is sufficient for anyone, even you. The best criticism is the one I listed -that is all.
Second, “…they are good enough that we can figure out when they are faulty. For example, we can tell that our dreams are not real. And finally, if we did not trust our own cognitive facilities, what could we trust?” I am actually appealing to our cognitive abilities: reason, logic, mathematics… the systems of apriori knowledge. You are appealing to empirical reasoning. Both are cognitive. So, I don’t see how this addresses the problem of empiricism vs. rationalism with respect to teleological arguments. You are skirting the issue. The argument shows that as design augments, so does the probability that it was created. This is provable both empirically and rationally. As something becomes infinitely complex, its probability of being designed approaches one.
Third, “but the point is that an equation is not necessarily true just because it’s consistent with itself” It is true if it consistent with other truths. Those truths can be logical or empirical and neither will contradict each other. SImple. Moreover, if it was consistent with itself, it would be a tautology: a=a.
I’ll respond to Nicholas first:
I think that if we truly want our beliefs to correspond to reality, then we should accept the beliefs that there is evidence for, and reject the ones that there is not evidence for. That is my attitude because I am a seeker of truth, and I make the assumption that whoever I’m talking to wants their beliefs to correspond to reality as well. I don’t see why exempting traditional beliefs from a burden of evidence is likely to get us closer to the truth.
When you talk about “deity(s) at all,” if you closely consider the deities that have been believed in over the course of human history, you realize that they have so little in common that you can hardly consider there to be a common belief between humans about the supernatural at all. Also, if a Deist God exists, then He has no relevance to our lives at all, and it doesn’t matter if He exists or not. So I think we should only concern ourselves with whether a benevolent God interested in us exists, because that’s the only God whose existence actually matters.
I start with science because science has been built on evidence, so it makes a great starting point imho.
John, let’s say in your hypothetical world that one guy starts postulating that they live in the computer world, even without any evidence. But another one says a supernatural God created the world. Other religious people postulate different Gods that created the world for different reasons and in different ways. Another says the world is entirely the result of the natural laws they observe, and brought itself into existence. What would be the most rational belief for someone living in that world? I would suggest the most rational thing to believe in is the natural laws that govern that world, and be skeptical about the other theories. The more specific the theory, especially with a total lack of evidence, the more skeptical that person should be about the theory.
So I think we’ve reached a basic disagreement: I say that math only corresponds to reality if it begins with well-defined meanings to start with, and you’re saying that an equation is true if it is consistent with other truths. This seems to be our basic disagreement about your “proof.” Let me offer a counter example: the equations of string theory have the potential to perfectly describe the physics of our world (if their constants are correctly defined, and the correct equation is found). And yet, even its most ardent supporters (to my knowledge at least) don’t say it’s necessarily true because of that consistency. They say it might be true and hope for empirical evidence for verification. Just because it’s consistent doesn’t mean it’s true. I’m sure there have been many other equations in the history of physics that were consistent with other theories and empirical evidence up to that point in time, but were ultimately proven false.
But they do have evidence. A computer world would have to follow certain ordered sets. As those ordered sets become more complex so does the likelihood that it was assembled. Moreover, John’s example works well enough for the “religious” people you have brought in to the example, Ben. I think he is right to say, “So, what?” because this shows that any assertion made about so called “qua” evidence is null -at best. You cannot hold rational assertions outside things that are not well-defined and science does not meet that standard. You keep, from what I have read of this discussion, jumping back to “science provides explanations and as predictive power..blah blah blah…” but you can’t criticize the theist world view given that your stance is no better -the only true scientific stance to hold on God is an agnostic one(NOTE: theist is not equal to religious, so from what I know about John, you would be wise to move beyond the focus on dogmatism and religious irrationality and move toward some logical-axiomatic theism to make any head way).
Adam, I’m not sure what you mean by “ordered sets,” but if you simply mean that the world would follow rules, I wouldn’t consider that evidence because it’s not making any prediction. If you could explain a bit further I’d appreciate it. I agree that the most scientific/rational stance in an agnostic one, if what you mean by “agnostic” is that we can’t know for certain. But I call also be atheist, as well as agnostic, if I think God is unlikely to exist, and therefore believe that He does not exist. If John doesn’t believe in a God that hears and answers prayers, then the debate becomes quite a bit less interesting to me.
I’ll recommend it again: the chapter titled “But It Fits!” in Stephen Law’s book Believing Bullshit. Just because the theory fits the evidence doesn’t mean the evidence supports the theory. The theory must make surprising predictions if it is going to achieve strong confirmation. A theory that cannot be disproven is a weak theory, because it can never achieve strong confirmation.
I, like John, am a mathematician (Ph.D student Colorado); I know him from our debates and classes during my undergrad work. Let me explain my points:
In mathematical biology, we have a theorem in differential analysis that was spawned by the computer science boys. They held that there was the possibility of randomly generated programs that could exhibit different degrees of complexity, but as the complexity augments, so does the probability that it was actively designed. This was discovered by Batman with respect to biology -as order augments, so does likelihood of design.
To better explain what this means, consider a complex bacteria that can eat plastic. It may or may not be complex when compared to other bacteria by type. Now to determine complexity, we look at it comparatively or associatively (looking at the specific characteristics that produce variance). Both of these determinations (comparison and associations) require a whole bunch of causes that effect the bacteria’s nature. However, it becomes less and less likely that a bacteria was not actively designed (f.y.i. natural bacteria does not eat plastic -that is very “unlikely”) when comparison augments to a point along with association that causes divergence from standard comparatives and general associations –these generalizations are SCIENTIFIC, yet ad hoc. We, then, basically conclude that there is a point where the probability approaches one (John hit on this earlier, it is a teleological argument).
So, if you saw this bacteria on a dish, and it looked nothing like any other bacteria, it also had as specific task that required specifications, then it is said to be mathematically certain that it was designed. The CDC uses this standard to differentiate amid engineered viruses and non-eneginered viruses.
This argument is pure probability and has assumptions built into it. However, it uses mathematics not in the sense that John is using it. He knows that I disagree with his purist stance on the rational and consistent nature of mathematics (even if the argument he makes is very compelling).
The outcome of my point, Ben, is that it is more likely that, or just as likely that, the world was created by something; be it God or not, it was engineered and established . Unless you, however, think that the world is not complex… but I doubt that. Most science proponents usually won’t sacrifice that.
Your last comment is interesting. I had to scroll up to John’s critique of it at the beginning of this long form. I second it. A theory does not need to meet those conditions strictly. Dr. Law loves his own definitions because they provide him with a soapbox. However, the idea of strong confirmation is not necessarily derived from surprising predictions, but rather accurate data evaluation, deduction, and conclusion generation to allow such predictive power. Law is falling into a semantic game and trying to add conditions to confirmability that are not normative in the scientific community.
Adam,
It is nice to see you jump into the fray. I think that your points are interesting. I still think that your empirical reasoning based in fine-tuning is great, but it does not avoid the problems that confront all empiricists. This makes you limited to the same skeptical problems that they must deal with, whereas the rationalist system avoids it by adhering to assumptions and truths via a-priori reasoning. Just think of the Axiom of Choice for a moment and its relation to Pareto-efficiency!!
Bennion,
You keep jumping back into the empirical world as expected. I must admit that I follow the tradition of Leibniz and think of God as more like Kevin Flynn off of Tron -that is a summary of how I also view the world: Digital Mechanics. So, that makes our argument difficult given that your keep using the standard atheistic attacks that are built to pick-out the inconsistencies in religion. I would agree that there are such inconsistencies and I would agree that they are crazy. However, axiomatic theism built in a frame-work of Digital Mechanics works around the empirical attacks by appealing to the same argument Adam and I used about fine-tuning built digitally.
Let me address your finer points:
You said: “So I think we’ve reached a basic disagreement: I say that math only corresponds to reality if it begins with well-defined meanings to start with, and you’re saying that an equation is true if it is consistent with other truths. This seems to be our basic disagreement about your “proof.” Let me offer a counter example: the equations of string theory have the potential to perfectly describe the physics of our world (if their constants are correctly defined, and the correct equation is found). And yet, even its most ardent supporters (to my knowledge at least) don’t say it’s necessarily true because of that consistency. They say it might be true and hope for empirical evidence for verification. Just because it’s consistent doesn’t mean it’s true.”
This is great. I do not deny that mathematics must fall with in some well-defined meanings. We have axioms that provide those meanings. Indeed, those axioms produce definitions that are said to be well-defined if they fit the axiom and the provable system in question (see Incompleteness Theorem about some implications about how this fails to work when jumping amid systems). So, we usually have very well-defined meanings and usually, say 99% of the time, our assumptions are quite sound. The outcome of this is simple and is the basis for science’s use of mathematics: a proof that is consistent and deductively sound will NEVER contradict an empirically verified implication or truth. We say that all mathematical proofs are verifiable if correct. That is how much faith we have in empirical matters of fact! We think they are great, but ONLY when they confirm the math. If they don’t then, either the observation is incorrect or the math was bad.
This means that if I start with sound axiomatic assumptions, I can built a system that will discover anything I want as long as my deductions (steps) are correct. That is all it takes. And physics has become the master of using this method -indeed, all the advances in physics since Pythagorus and Euclid depended on this notion. This is very simple. So, by this God is provable if the proof is constructed correctly. The question is: can a proof be constructed correctly to prove God, and what, if any, are the assumptions and how do they relate to the axioms. This is the only problem, but it is a huge one. Sometimes it is as hard as empirically trying to describe what happens in the 5th dimension! This is why Godel’s Proof is so powerful. It only has minor problems that are not lethal to the proof. Maybe we will find out how to remove those problems, or maybe we will find worse ones -only time will tell. However, the math and the probability that God exists in not unlikely as you have held, there is at least just as much evidence that God’s existence is equally likely!!!! This is why you cannot rationally believe that “IT MUST BE THE CASE THAT” God’s existence is unlikely. It just does not work with your own system. A scientific approach is more becoming -merely, wondering and searching without affirmation.
Adam, I think you have some very interesting points. Do you believe in the theory of evolution? I could certainly not do justice to the amount of evidence in its favor here, and I will not try to, but if you are not convinced of it then it would be well worth your time to read more about it and the evidence in its favor. I’ll assume you’re arguing that our world exhibits evidence of design because of the complexity of the laws of physics.
I think the fine-tuning argument has been well-responded-to by, for example, Victor Stenger, but your argument is different than the fine-tuning argument. I haven’t heard it before, and it seems like a pretty good argument. Let’s say, for the sake of argument, that I found it convincing. If the laws of physics were intelligently designed, and let’s call the designer “God,” then God exists outside of the laws of physics. Is God’s intelligence the result of complex structure? If so, he is subject to yet another set of physical laws, and we haven’t explained where those laws came from, so we’ve just added a complex hypothesis that doesn’t explain anything. So what if God’s intelligence is not the result of complex structure? That seems inherently unlikely to me because every form of intelligence that has ever been observed in this world is the result of complex structure. It just seems to me that it is more likely that the laws of physics are complex for reasons that are beyond our comprehension than there is a floaty-ghostlike form of intelligence that exists outside the laws of physics. The idea of intelligence without structure sounds more like a primitive human’s view of intelligence than a serious, real possibility. It just smacks of superstition. Humans have an innate tendency to assign intelligence and purpose to natural things, so I’m very suspicious that maybe that tendency is coming into play here.
I realize that at this point it’s hard to put mathematical rigor behind those arguments, and difficult to assign probabilities to those concepts in a defensible way, but I thought I’d just give my honest opinion and hope it’s not stomped on too much 😉 I’ll think about that argument some more.
John, apparently Kant’s rejection of your argument is that “existence is not a property,” rather the assertion that something exists doesn’t so much change the concept of a thing as it does assert that the concept corresponds to something in reality. So his rejection is pretty similar to mine (in my opinion), and is apparently widely accepted by philosophers. I’m sure that someone somewhere on the web puts it better than I’ve put it here. I’d like to hear your rebuttal, though I’m pretty close to leaving this argument and moving on to other things, since I feel like I’ve already described my objections pretty well.
There are several fine-tuning arguments that abound. This one is more popular among mathematicians that world in fields like biology. The arguments are more beautiful and rigorous than what I am making it out to be.
I don’t think that the infinite regress you are pointing out is a problem for the argument. I think it is not problematic to hold that their may be some higher-order-type complexities that abound outside our perceivable world. I am fine with that, and it dove-tails nicely with my scientific world view.
I also would like to emphasis that I deny the ghost-like-crazy-abstract-God-stuff. God could be an engineer or some-type of scientist that is experimenting with intelligent creatures, programs (John’s view which I am moderately sympathetic) that exist informationally and have been inserted into a nexus or something that is called earth, and he could merely be a highly advanced multi-dimension entity, or God could be a collective race of developers of worlds or manipulators of the laws of physics. The great thing about science is that it captures theistic thought and works with it; the reasoning that man has done from the armchair and the field that have created such beautiful equations and theories often work in unison with God-ideas and theism not against it –don’t freak out, John; your brilliance will come around to the dark side one day 🙂 .
I am getting off subject. Addressing you point mathematically and directly, we could always say that God’s complexity is transcendent and progressive. So, he could be very complex, but his complexity is contingent on a unification theory or an completeness axiom (the Holy Grail of science and mathematics, and, if found, would stop our bickering) not on other complexities. Things, oddly, exhibit complexity when built for purpose, but something like “a god” may be based on a very simple thing or a simple construct of laws; so, god may have to conform as we do to certain laws or maybe higher-order laws that exist multidimentionally -I like to compare it to a Dr. Manhattan-type idea because it demonstrates the possibility of such a being can be theoretically compatible with out having to jump into the difficult world of Digital Mechanics as John does (Oh, John, Manhattan would kick Kevin Flynn’s ass -just say’n).
This addresses your question about evolution, I love it as a theory! I have seen it play out, and the adaptive nature of organisms is quite astonishing, but does not contradict my teleological word-view; it reinforces it.
@John, are you presenting that paper on coordination structures at AMA?
Interesting stuff, Adam. I definitely concede that these theories are possible, although I consider them unlikely (partly because of the infinite regress problem, although that’s definitely not a fatal blow). I guess I find the theories interesting, but most of what I write about on my own blog and on Facebook comments and the like is directed at a traditional Christian religious God. It’s because I come from a very religious background (Mormon) and most of my friends and family still are very religious, and I’m hoping to convince some of them that the evidence for what they believe is actually pretty questionable. I do it because I’m still kind of annoyed at the pressure that was placed on me to stay in that religion after I was convinced that it wasn’t true, and because I think most people would make better decisions and be better off without it. So while these are interesting academic questions, they’re not really what concern me most, which is more religious stuff. So while it’s been interesting, I think it’s time for me to bow out of the debate. If you’re interested in following my own blog, you’re welcome to comment on it. It’s always fun to have some very educated and intelligent commenters 🙂
http://bennionsthoughts.blogspot.com
It was great talking to you, Adam.
I know how it is to deal with the family and friends bull-crap. You see, I too run into this type of problem with by believing in Digital Mechanics.
I have given that paper several times this year. I received a request from the AMA and PMT, but I don’t have the time to deal with PMT. I think I might give this fall a shot with the AMA. I also have ASU giving me hell; they really want me to enter their PhD program, but I don’t like the gloom of “The Valley of The Sun.” I might take U of U up on that PhD in Organizational Behavior offer sometime. I am too busy to think about it now and I have a year to let it sink-in.
I also think that only a pervert would like Dr. M. 🙂
Oh, and String Theory has gaps in its math. In fact, it is a great system and largely consistent. Nonetheless, I know that its assumptions rest on uncertain claims. If these can be rooted-out and improved, we would be back where Relativity began: waiting for when we can test it empirically so as to prove it.
Great talking to you! I understand how it is to have to deal with religious folk, especially when they are family. It kind of makes you feel like you are surrounded by mad and crazy people. I wish you well with that, and I will drop in on you blog when I get a chance.