Is it Natural Evil?

Epericurus’ old questions are yet unanswered.
Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able but not willing? Then is he malevolent? Or is he both willing and able, whence then is he evil?
This world is a world filled with daily experiences and moments, each of which result in either a positive or negative experience. Not withstanding the positive, there are many examples of the negative. In fact, the negative experiences, which range from simple frustrations to complete and utter torment, seem to exist much more prevalently in our lives than do the positive. We, as humans, are much more desirous of the good experiences and attempt to escape the negative. We all enjoy life, pleasure, love, laughter, joy, frolic, and diversions; however, we hate pain, suffering, sickness, worry, fear, and death — we hate such negative experiences so greatly that we attempt almost unimaginable things to eliminate that negative experience from our life.

Referring to Epericurs’s question can evil exist with an omniscient, omnipotent, and omni-benevolent God?

Many philosophers, and theologians have endeavored to solve this almost paradoxical situation. The dilemma that the problem of evil poses is that there exist a logical contradiction between Omni-benevolent God and Evil. This can be demonstrated as follows:
I. God is omni-benevolent
II. God is omnipotent
III. Evil exist
III, II, and I cannot co-exist and all remain as true statements. If two are true, then one must always be false. This is obviously propounded by Epericurs’s inquiry, that if an all-loving being that is all-powerful exist, then he must (because he is all-loving) desire that evil be obliterated, and because he is all-powerful his ability to obliterate evil should be enacted. Therefore, God is either impotent because he can’t destroy evil, or not omni-benevolent because he allows evil. This logical contradiction brings many questions of unrest and frustration to understand how “God” can allow such evil. Theologians will usually attempt to say that evil doesn’t exist, or that the problem of evil doesn’t prove a solid inconsistency. Moreover, the general public is tempted to superficially dismiss this problem out of fear, to say, “we need evil to grow.” Another common statement is, “we need evil to understand good.” I agree with both of the statements because they both contain some relativity to why evil exist, yet they present some very interesting problems. “We need evil to grow” -this statement is quite under supported and difficult to understand when we are discussing an omniscient, omnipotent God because if god is omniscient and omnipotent, then one must assume that he would have the power and knowledge to create a world in where no evil is required to better his creators. Furthermore, the statement, “We need evil to understand the good” seems as a way to appease evil and good, thus, eliminating the logical contradiction to the problem of evil. However, it walks a very fine line of saying that God requires evil to be good, thus he is the proponent of evil. Or, it could also infer that God is not sufficiently powerful to not create an existence in which no evil is necessary to define the good. Thus, we can see how these statements are dodging the very contradiction that makes the problem of evil–the problem of evil.
Notwithstanding the previous, many brilliant minds have provided certain rebuttals to the POE.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz argued as follows.
1. If God is omnipotent then this world is the best of all possible worlds.
2. The best possible world is one in which Good is maximized and evil minimized. For example, an agent that displays courage is better than one that doesn’t.
3. Without evil in the world, the agent wouldn’t have been able to display courage so God created the world with evil
This argument tries to establish a dichotomy that evil is present because this is the “best possible world” and, “an agent that displays courage is better than one that doesn’t.”
I feel that the pivotal point in this argument lies in premise 1: If God is omnipotent then this world is the best of all possible worlds. One must assume that if God is omniscient and omnipotent, then this world must be the best of all possible worlds. However, it would seem that this premise fails to promptly explain God’s omni-benevolent characteristics. If this is the best of all possible worlds, and God is truly all good, then why dose this world exhibit instances of evil? One could rebuke by stating that premise #3 addresses that concern. I would have to agree that #3 addresses the omni-benevolence of God, yet it only seems to do so only half-heartedly. Why should we assume that an agent that shows courage is better than one who dose not. If God would have crated a perfectly good world there would be no need for courage, because it would not be necessary; thus, one is compelled to believe that courage only exist because we are living in a evil world, and less perfect state — of which dose not necessarily mean that we are better than an agent living in a world witch dose not possess evil. An additional criticism of Leibniz’s argument is found in premise #2. How is it that one can assume that this world is one in which good is maximized and evil is minimized? By the #1 we must assume that if God created this world, then evil must be minimized, yet one could state that evil is actually maximized and much more common then the good. There are many more arguments that exist that attempt to answer the problem of evil, yet the one that has the most appeal for me is Plantinga’s response. (Simplified)
God created persons with free will. Free will is something of tremendous value. God could not eliminate much of the evil and suffering in this world without thereby eliminating the greater good of having created persons with free will with whom he could have relationships and who are able to love one another and do good deeds.
Plantinga continues to imply the necessity of evil by saying that God cannot do that, which is logically impossible. Therefore, God has actualized this world with evil because of the apparent logical necessity. I would have to admit I am a proponent of Alvin planting’s argument. This argument especially addresses the concept of moral evils, yet what about natural? Which are obviously not caused by mortal evils, and even seem unnecessary. How can unnecessary evils be justified as a greater good? One could not imagine a loving parent intentionally letting his or her child suffer just to suffer. So, how can unnecessary evils be beneficial or justifiable? Moreover, how can unnecessary evils be compatible with the orthodox view of God?
-John