Is God Truly Omnipotent?

Lets examine this commonly held belief that God is omnipotent, and, by this we know that the majority of the populous would assume that God is omnipotent to the point that all things are possible. The term “all things” would also include illogical things such as: 2+2=5, 6-6+6, and actualize/alter past events. However, can God really actualize the illogical?

I previously posted an argument that addresses Alvin Plantinga’s views on the existence of natural evil. My argument is as follows:

1. If Satan is a spiritual being (not consisting of anything physical), then he has no influence or effect on physical objects.
2. Satan is spiritual.
3. Therefore he has no influence over physical worlds

I have had a number of valid objections, and I can see why. One objection stated “the argument works against God too. For Satan, fill in “God.” Thus, God has no influence over the physical world.” I agree with this objection superficially. However, I feel that there are some very important points that seem to make one believe that it doesn’t apply to God. If we examine some of the attributes of God when compared with Satan we find some very important differences. First, God is a being that is omnipotent, where as Satan is a being impotent and limited. Due to the fact that God is omnipotent then he would have control over a physical world, where as Satan would not.
With that concluded, an objector might state that God (according to my argument) cannot be non-physical and logically have control over this physical world. This objection brings up a number of possible solutions
1. One could state that God is composed of physical and spiritual parts.
2. State that God is omnipotent and has dominion over the physical world because he created it.
3. State that because he is omniscient and omnipotent he uses spiritual means to effect possible changes and occurrence on the physical world.
By taking any one of the following responses one could attempt to formulate a sufficiently sound argument to thwart the previous objection, yet would it be logically possible according to the previous argument?
I feel that even if one were to use the previous argument one still might run the chance of committing a fallacy or dealing with semantics in order to define God, so it would seem that the argument can’t retain it’s validity.
I think that it is possible, but I think that it is much easier to edit the premises of the current argument:

1. If Satan is an impotent spiritual being (not consisting of anything physical), then he has no influence or effect on physical objects.
2. Satan is a impotent spiritual being.
3. Therefore he has not influence over physical worlds

By changing (1) we have created a much tighter conclusion that God can actualize physical worlds being spiritual because he is omnipotent. This is due to the fact that premise 1 refers to only impotent spiritual beings. Therefore, Alvin Plantinga’s view that natural evil is caused by the free acts of the devil and other malevolent spiritual beings is flawed.
John

An Argument Against The Cosmological Argument

To be sincere, I have done very little study on the Cosmological Argument. Thus, I am quite unqualified to refute, in depth, this argument. However, I have given it a few moment’s thought, and I have decided that it seems erroneous to assume the possible of an uncaused cause.
Below, you will see the argument that I feel refutes the cosmological argument.

1. If an uncaused cause is the result of itself, then nothing else could have existed to cause its existence. (premise)
2. If there was nothing in existence, then it is impossible to have the occurrence of a cause.(Premise)
3. An uncaused cause is a cause. (premise)
4. Therefore, an uncaused cause cannot exist. 1-3

It would seem possible that, despite my limited metaphysical knowledge, that if there exist nothing (nothing meaning: no time, energy, or space), then there are no possible causes to bring about an effect. This is supported by the fact that if God is an uncaused cause, as the cosmological argument proves, then God caused himself out of nothing. I say nothing because that is exactly what had to have happened. You see an uncaused cause has to be free of all possible actions of other causes, which includes time, space, and energy. Therefore, with out the existence of any of the previous how is it possible that an uncaused could have caused it self?

Plantinga and Natural Evil

I have been reviewing Alvin Plantinga’s article The Free Will Defense. I must say it is an amazing philosophical work, but when I reviewed his response to the existence of natural evils, I could not agree with his argument on the whole. Plantinga uses an argument presented by St. Augustine that attributes natural evil to actions of non-human creatures. These non-human creatures are obviously evil spirits, but more specifically, the Devil and his angels. Plantinga uses his argument of free will to support St. Augustine’s argument. He doses this by demonstrating that the free actions of non human beings influence natural occurrences, and these “natural occurrences” are aimed at causing men misery. I think that this argument is valid if we can readily show that these evil spirits have control over nature and other phenomena. If we were to approach this argument using scripture, is has very little support. One may be tempted to use the Book of Job as justification that Satan can in fact control nature. However, if we read in chapter 1 and 2 we find that Satan was unable to curse Job with any natural evils unless God allowed it. Thus, it would seem that Satan has no complete or colossal power over nature, especially in the quantity that we experience, without the permission given from God.

If God were to give Satan such permission without a morally sufficient reason for doing so, then God would obviously appear as malevolent. Furthermore, from a theological point of view, the idea that Satan would want to have power over nature seems somewhat unavailing to his principle purpose. Satan is charged with causing men to sin, so to assume that Satan has power over the elements so that men can sin seems inconsistent with him being the source of sin. Sin has to do with humans not obeying God’s commandments, or following the immoral teachings of the adversary.

From a philosophical view we seem to run into a similar problem. The problem of evil exists because of a contradiction between “God is omnipotent and omni-benevolent” and “evil exist”.
Plantinga’s argument supporting Free Will is amazing, and I feel that it satisfies moral evils and the previous contradiction. However, his argument that Satan is the cause of natural evils because of Satan’s free will seems to provide a response, but how successful is it?
Plantinga’s argument is a theodicy; he is assuming that Satan is free to exercise dominion over the natural world. This seems fallacious because of the following reasons:

1. If Satan is a spiritual being (not consisting of anything physical), then he has no influence or effect on physical objects.
2. Satan is spiritual.
3. Therefore he has not influence over physical worlds.

If the previous is true, then the idea that Satan causes natural evils is false. This is because Satan is a being commonly accepted as a spirit living on this earth, yet in a separate dimension. Now to avoid arguing time and space held dimensions, we shall say that this dimensions in which Satan lives, is purely a spiritual dimension (This is assuming that Satan is not omnipotent, for if he were omnipotent then he would logically have control over the natural world). A spiritual dimension would consist of maxims that are only acted upon spiritually. This is to say that Satan is free to act and do as a sentient being only according to things that are spiritually related. The physical world consist of elements, atoms, and actions that are not necessarily spiritual, thus, it would seem that Satan would not have any control over the natural world.
It dose, however, provide some very interesting insight about the possibility of men, who are spiritual and physical creatures (from a theology view) could be influenced by a evil spirit that is acting freely according to spiritual (non physical) things. Thus, we see that Plantingas’s support of St. Augustine’s argument is not one hundred percent conclusive.

Homosexuality

I. If a species is to survive, then the species must reproduce.
2. In order to survive (naturally) certain biological means must be instituted.
3. Biological means that are necessary for reproduction in humans consist of male and female counterparts.
4. Thus, reproduction must involve sexual relations between males and females.
5. Therefore, any other relationships involving situations other than those consisting of male and females, is biologically unnecessary to the survival to the species.

Is it Natural Evil?

Epericurus’ old questions are yet unanswered.
Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able but not willing? Then is he malevolent? Or is he both willing and able, whence then is he evil?
This world is a world filled with daily experiences and moments, each of which result in either a positive or negative experience. Not withstanding the positive, there are many examples of the negative. In fact, the negative experiences, which range from simple frustrations to complete and utter torment, seem to exist much more prevalently in our lives than do the positive. We, as humans, are much more desirous of the good experiences and attempt to escape the negative. We all enjoy life, pleasure, love, laughter, joy, frolic, and diversions; however, we hate pain, suffering, sickness, worry, fear, and death — we hate such negative experiences so greatly that we attempt almost unimaginable things to eliminate that negative experience from our life.

Referring to Epericurs’s question can evil exist with an omniscient, omnipotent, and omni-benevolent God?

Many philosophers, and theologians have endeavored to solve this almost paradoxical situation. The dilemma that the problem of evil poses is that there exist a logical contradiction between Omni-benevolent God and Evil. This can be demonstrated as follows:
I. God is omni-benevolent
II. God is omnipotent
III. Evil exist
III, II, and I cannot co-exist and all remain as true statements. If two are true, then one must always be false. This is obviously propounded by Epericurs’s inquiry, that if an all-loving being that is all-powerful exist, then he must (because he is all-loving) desire that evil be obliterated, and because he is all-powerful his ability to obliterate evil should be enacted. Therefore, God is either impotent because he can’t destroy evil, or not omni-benevolent because he allows evil. This logical contradiction brings many questions of unrest and frustration to understand how “God” can allow such evil. Theologians will usually attempt to say that evil doesn’t exist, or that the problem of evil doesn’t prove a solid inconsistency. Moreover, the general public is tempted to superficially dismiss this problem out of fear, to say, “we need evil to grow.” Another common statement is, “we need evil to understand good.” I agree with both of the statements because they both contain some relativity to why evil exist, yet they present some very interesting problems. “We need evil to grow” -this statement is quite under supported and difficult to understand when we are discussing an omniscient, omnipotent God because if god is omniscient and omnipotent, then one must assume that he would have the power and knowledge to create a world in where no evil is required to better his creators. Furthermore, the statement, “We need evil to understand the good” seems as a way to appease evil and good, thus, eliminating the logical contradiction to the problem of evil. However, it walks a very fine line of saying that God requires evil to be good, thus he is the proponent of evil. Or, it could also infer that God is not sufficiently powerful to not create an existence in which no evil is necessary to define the good. Thus, we can see how these statements are dodging the very contradiction that makes the problem of evil–the problem of evil.
Notwithstanding the previous, many brilliant minds have provided certain rebuttals to the POE.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz argued as follows.
1. If God is omnipotent then this world is the best of all possible worlds.
2. The best possible world is one in which Good is maximized and evil minimized. For example, an agent that displays courage is better than one that doesn’t.
3. Without evil in the world, the agent wouldn’t have been able to display courage so God created the world with evil
This argument tries to establish a dichotomy that evil is present because this is the “best possible world” and, “an agent that displays courage is better than one that doesn’t.”
I feel that the pivotal point in this argument lies in premise 1: If God is omnipotent then this world is the best of all possible worlds. One must assume that if God is omniscient and omnipotent, then this world must be the best of all possible worlds. However, it would seem that this premise fails to promptly explain God’s omni-benevolent characteristics. If this is the best of all possible worlds, and God is truly all good, then why dose this world exhibit instances of evil? One could rebuke by stating that premise #3 addresses that concern. I would have to agree that #3 addresses the omni-benevolence of God, yet it only seems to do so only half-heartedly. Why should we assume that an agent that shows courage is better than one who dose not. If God would have crated a perfectly good world there would be no need for courage, because it would not be necessary; thus, one is compelled to believe that courage only exist because we are living in a evil world, and less perfect state — of which dose not necessarily mean that we are better than an agent living in a world witch dose not possess evil. An additional criticism of Leibniz’s argument is found in premise #2. How is it that one can assume that this world is one in which good is maximized and evil is minimized? By the #1 we must assume that if God created this world, then evil must be minimized, yet one could state that evil is actually maximized and much more common then the good. There are many more arguments that exist that attempt to answer the problem of evil, yet the one that has the most appeal for me is Plantinga’s response. (Simplified)
God created persons with free will. Free will is something of tremendous value. God could not eliminate much of the evil and suffering in this world without thereby eliminating the greater good of having created persons with free will with whom he could have relationships and who are able to love one another and do good deeds.
Plantinga continues to imply the necessity of evil by saying that God cannot do that, which is logically impossible. Therefore, God has actualized this world with evil because of the apparent logical necessity. I would have to admit I am a proponent of Alvin planting’s argument. This argument especially addresses the concept of moral evils, yet what about natural? Which are obviously not caused by mortal evils, and even seem unnecessary. How can unnecessary evils be justified as a greater good? One could not imagine a loving parent intentionally letting his or her child suffer just to suffer. So, how can unnecessary evils be beneficial or justifiable? Moreover, how can unnecessary evils be compatible with the orthodox view of God?
-John